# Chapter 3. Classical Demand Theory (Part 1) Xiaoxiao Hu

# **3.A.** Introduction: Take  $\geq$  as the primitive

- (1) Assumption(s) on  $\succeq$  so that  $\succeq$  can be represented with a utility function
- (2) Utility maximization and demand function
- (3) Utility as a function of prices and wealth (indirect utility)
- (4) Expenditure minimization and expenditure function
- (5) Relationship among demand function, indirect utility function, and expenditure function

# **3.B. Preference Relations: Basic Properties**

**Rationality** We would assume *Rationality* (*Completeness and Transitivity*) throughout the chapter.

**Definition 3.B.1.** The preference relation  $\succeq$  on *X* is rational if it possesses the following two properties:

- (i) Completeness: For all  $x, y \in X$ , we have  $x \succeq y$  or  $y \succeq x$ (or both).
- (ii) Transitivity: For all  $x, y, z \in X$ , if  $x \succeq y$  and  $y \succeq z$ , then  $x \succsim z$ . 3

#### **Monotonicity**

**Definition 3.B.2.** The preference relation  $\succeq$  on X is *monotone* if *x, y* ∈ *X* and *y* ≫ *x* implies *y* ≻ *x.* It is *strongly monotone* if  $y \geq x \& y \neq x$  implies  $y \succ x$ .



## **Monotonicity**

**Claim.** If  $\geq$  is strongly monotone, then it is monotone.

**Example.** Here is an example of a preference that is monotone, but not strongly monotone:

$$
u(x_1,x_2)=x_1
$$
 in  $\mathbb{R}^2_+$ .

#### **Local Nonsatiation**

**Definition 3.B.3.** The preference relation  $\geq$  on *X* is *locally nonsatiated* if for every  $x \in X$  and every  $\varepsilon > 0$ ,  $\exists y \in X$  such

that  $||y - x|| \leq \varepsilon$  and  $y \succ x$ .



## **Local Nonsatiation**

**Claim.** *Local nonsatiation* is a weaker desirability assumption compared to *monotonicity*. If  $\succsim$  is monotone, then it is locally nonsatiated.

**Example.** Here is an example of a preference that is locally nonsatiated, but not monotone:

$$
u(x_1, x_2) = x_1 - |1 - x_2| \text{ in } \mathbb{R}^2_+.
$$

## **Convexity Assumptions**

**Definition 3.B.4.** The preference relation  $\succeq$  on X is *convex* if for every  $x \in X$ , the upper contour set of  $x, \{y \in X : y \succeq x\}$ is convex; that is, if  $y \succsim x$  and  $z \succsim x$ , then  $\alpha y + (1 - \alpha)z \succsim x$ for any  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ .  $\{y\in\mathbb{R}^2_+:y\succsim x\}$  $\{y\in\mathbb{R}^2_+:y\succsim x\}$  $\alpha y + (1 - \alpha) z$  $\alpha v + (1 - \alpha)z$  $\{y\in\mathbb{R}^2_+:y\sim x\}$  $\{y\in\mathbb{R}^2_+: y\sim x\}$  $\{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 : x \succeq y\}$  $\{y \in \mathbb{R}^2_+ : x \succeq y\}$ x,  $\mathbf{x}_1$ Convex **Nonconvex** 8

## **Properties associated with convexity**

- (i) Diminishing marginal rates of subsititution
- (ii) Preference for diversity (implied by (i))

**Definition 3.B.5.** The preference relation  $\geq$  on *X* is *strictly convex* if for every  $x \in X$ , we have that  $y \succsim x$  and  $z \succsim x$ , and  $y \neq z$  implies  $\alpha y + (1 - \alpha)z \succ x$  for all  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ *.* 

## **Homothetic Preference**

**Definition 3.B.6.** A monotone preference relation  $\geq$  on  $X =$  $\mathbb{R}_{+}^{L}$  is *homothetic* if all indifference sets are related by proportional expansion along rays; that is, if  $x \sim y$ , then  $\alpha x \sim \alpha y$  for any  $\alpha \geq 0$ .  $\alpha x$  $\alpha y$  $X_1$ 

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## **Quasilinear Preference**

**Definition 3.B.7.**  $\succsim$  on  $X = (-\infty, \infty) \times \mathbb{R}^{L-1}$  is *quasilinear* 

with respect to commodity 1 (*numeraire* commodity) if

- (i) All the indifference sets are parallel displacements of each other along the axis of commodity 1. That is, if  $x \sim y$ , then  $(x + \alpha e_1) \sim (y + \alpha e_1)$  for  $e_1 = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0)$  and any  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ .
- (ii) Good 1 is desirable; that is  $x + \alpha e_1 > x$  for all x and  $\alpha > 0$ . 12

## **Quasilinear Preference**



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# **3.C. Preference and Utility**

*Key Question.* When can a rational preference relation be

represented by a utility function?

*Answer:* If the preference relation is continuous.

**Definition 3.C.1.** The preference relation  $\succeq$  on *X* is *continuous* if it is preserved in the limits. That is, for any sequence of pairs  $\{(x^n, y^n)\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$  with  $x^n \succsim y^n$  for all  $n, x = \lim_{n \to \infty} x^n$ ,  $y = \lim_{n \to \infty} y^n$ , we have  $x \succsim y$ .

**Claim** 1.  $\geq$  *is continuous if* and *only if for* all *x*, *the upper contour set*  $\{y \in X : y \succsim x\}$  *and the lower contour set*  $\{y \in X : y \succsim x\}$  $X: x \succeq y$  *are both closed.* 

#### **Exercise**

**Claim 2.** A function  $f: \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$  is continuous if and

only if for all *a*, the set  $\{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : f(x) \ge a\}$  and the set

 ${x \in \mathbb{R}^n : f(x) \leq a}$  are both closed.

Prove the "only if" part of the claim above.

**Example 3.C.1.** Lexicographic Preference Relation on R<sup>2</sup>

 $x > y$  if either  $x_1 > y_1$ , or  $x_1 = y_1$  and  $x_2 > y_2$ .

*x* ∼ *y* if  $x_1 = y_1$  and  $x_2 = y_2$ .

**Claim.** Lexicographic Preference Relation on  $\mathbb{R}^2$  is not continuous.

**Claim.** Lexicographic Preference Relation on  $\mathbb{R}^2$  cannot be represented by  $u(\cdot)$ .



Lexicographic Preference

**Continuous Preference** Alternatively, we could use the fact that upper and lower contour sets of a continuous preference must be closed.



**Proposition 3.C.1** (Debreu's theorem)**.** *Suppose that the rational preference relation*  $\geq$  *on X is continuous and monotone. Then there exists continuous utility function*  $u(x)$  *that represents*  $\succsim$ , *i.e.*,  $u(x) \ge u(y)$  *if and only if*  $x \succsim y$ .

*Remark.*  $u(x)$  is not unique, any increasing transformation  $v(x) =$  $f(u(x))$  will represent  $\sum$ . We can also introduce countably many jumps in  $f(\cdot)$ .

## Assumptions of differentiability of  $u(x)$

The assumption of differentiability is commonly adopted for technical convenience, but is not applicable to all useful models.

## Assumptions of differentiability of  $u(x)$

Here is an example of preference that is not differentiable.

**Example** (Leontief Preference).  $x \succsim y$  if and only if  $\min\{x_1, x_2\} \ge$ 



**Implications of**  $\succeq$  and  $u$ 

(i)  $\succsim$  is convex  $\iff u: X \to \mathbb{R}$  is quasi-concave.

(ii) continuous  $\succsim$  on  $\mathbb{R}^L_+$  is homothetic  $\iff$  ∃ H.D.1  $u(x)$ 

(iii) continuous  $\succsim$  on  $(-\infty, \infty) \times \mathbb{R}^{L-1}_+$  is quasilinear with respect to Good  $1 \iff \exists u(x) = x_1 + \phi(x_2, ..., x_L)^T$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>In (i), all utility functions representing  $\succsim$  are quasiconcave; whereas (ii) and (iii) merely say that there exists at least one utility function that has the specific form. 24

## **Quasiconcave Utility**

**Definition.** The utility function  $u(\cdot)$  is *quasiconcave* if the set  $\{y \in \mathbb{R}^L_+ : u(y) \ge u(x)\}$  is convex for all *x* or, equivalently, if  $u(\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y) \ge \min\{u(x), u(y)\}\$ for all  $x, y$  and all  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ . If  $u(\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y) > \min\{u(x), u(y)\}$  for  $x \neq y$ and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ , then  $u(\cdot)$  is *strictly quasiconcave*.

# **3.D. Utility Maximization Problem (UMP)**

Assume throughout that preference is *rational*, *continuous*, *lo-*

*cally nonsatiated*, and *u*(*x*) continuous.

Consumer's *Utility Maximization Problem (UMP)*:

$$
\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L} u(x)
$$

s.t.  $p \cdot x \leq w$ 

**Existence of Solution**

**Proposition 3.D.1.** If  $p \gg 0$  and  $u(\cdot)$  is continuous, then the

*utility maximization problem has a solution.*

## **Existence of Solution**

Here, we provide two counter examples where the solution of UMP does not exists.

## **Counter Examples.**

(i) 
$$
B_{p,w}
$$
 is not closed:  $p \cdot x < w$ 

(ii)  $u(x)$  is not continuous:

$$
u(x) = \begin{cases} p \cdot x & \text{for } p \cdot x < w \\ 0 & \text{for } p \cdot x = w \end{cases}
$$

## **Walrasian demand correspondence/functions**

The solution of UMP, denoted by *x*(*p,w*), is called *Walrasian (* or *ordinary* or *market) demand correspondence*. When  $x(p, w)$  is single valued for all  $(p, w)$ , we refer to it as *Walrasian (* or *ordinary* or *market) demand function*.

## **Walrasian demand correspondence/functions**



#### **Properties of Walrasian demand correspondence**

**Proposition 3.D.2.** *Suppose that u*(*x*) *is a continuous utility function representing a locally nonsatiated preference relation*  $\succsim$  defined on the consumption set  $X = \mathbb{R}^L_+$ . Then the Wal*rasian demand correspondence x*(*p,w*) *possesses the following properties:*

*(i) Homogeneity of degree zero in*  $(p, w)$  :  $x(\alpha p, \alpha w)$  =  $x(p, w)$  *for any*  $p, w$  *and scalar*  $\alpha > 0$ *.* 

*(ii) Walras' Law:*  $p \cdot x = w$  *for all*  $x \in x(p, w)$ . 31

**Properties of Walrasian demand correspondence**

**Proposition 3.D.2 (continued).**

*(iii) Convexity/uniqueness:* If  $\geq$  *is convex, so that*  $u(\cdot)$  *is quasiconcave, then*  $x(p, w)$  *is a convex set. Moreover, if*  $\succeq$  *is strictly convex, so that u*(*·*) *is strictly quasiconcave, then*  $x(p, w)$  *consists of a single element.* 

We will take a break to review some mathematical results before proceeding with this Chapter.